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2 March 1949

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR  
THRU: CHIEF, ICAPS

Subject: Comments on Colonel Blakeney's Draft Memo dated  
24 February to the Director

1. The wording of the "Subject" of the draft memo in question contains the main divergence of opinion which I possess with the views of Colonel Blakeney. It is called: "An Idea for Furthering Centralization of all Intelligence." Why centralize further? After all, centralization and efficiency are not synonymous. In fact, "centralization," whether in the field of industry and commerce as monopoly, or in Government as the zenith of Statism may bring about results which are far from desirable.

2. Thus, I do not concur in the concept that the Director of Central Intelligence "take over the direction or operational control of the intelligence echelons of the Service Departments....." This would be an "opening wedge" indeed for a complete revamping of the executive departments of the Government. Instead of areas of competency, e.g., land, sea, and air each with total departmental responsibility, the logical implementation of the suggested concept on a functional basis would bring into existence an Intelligence Agency which would have within it land, sea, and air components. Why stop with intelligence? Why not consider the other substantive functions of the Services? Instead of what now exists let's set up a Director of Engineering to "take over the direction or operational control" of the Army Engineers, the Civil Engineer Corps of the Navy, and the engineering problems of the Department of Air.

3. I'm somewhat convinced that it is too late in the history of governmental development in our nation to abolish the executive structure built on the concept of areas of responsibility, e.g., foreign affairs - State; financial affairs - Treasury; etc., etc., and institute therefor a new system of agencies based on functions. It is also a significant coincidence that neither the Hoover Commission nor the Dulles Committee, in their efforts to improve the functions of the executive departments, recommended any steps which would bring about the type of centralized functional operation suggested by Colonel Blakeney.

4. If the Director of Central Intelligence were to have "direction or operational control of the intelligence echelons of the Service Departments," and eventually include those and the

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intelligence echelon of the Department of State all as "a part of a 'Research and Reports Division,'" how would the staff and departmental intelligence problems of the Service Agencies and of the Department of State be handled? I find it difficult to visualize how the distinction between departmental and staff intelligence, as presently defined and approved by the National Security Council, could be continued under the proposed setup.

5. The objective of securing "a coordinated viewpoint" on national intelligence as mentioned in paragraph 4 of subject draft memorandum is most commendable. Too often the national intelligence products of our Agency seem like the cherished pet concepts of some individual in ORE, who through good salesmanship sold the viewpoint to his superior, and with such additional support from higher levels the paper is issued as National Intelligence. Establishing the Intelligence Production Board of ORE is a step in the right direction and should aid considerably in strengthening the work of ORE. However, more provision should be made for IAC Agency participation in the formulation, development, and evaluation of all planning and issuance of National Intelligence Products. We should attempt to eliminate the dread disease of "prerogativitis" between national and departmental levels, realizing fully that the most mature and comprehensive weighing of every thought in a national intelligence paper will enhance the value of the product. There are several ways in which this might be accomplished. It is not, however, the purpose of this memorandum to pursue these thoughts at this time.

6. Colonel Blakeney is fully informed of the contents of this memorandum.



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